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Skepticism About Deterrence
Thomas S. Ulen*
In this Essay I first review the standard law-and-economics model of
how rational potential criminals decide whether to commit a crime, and
how rational criminals might be deterred from committing crime by
raising the expected costs of crime. I also show how that model has had
a deep impact on criminal-justice-system policy in the United States
since at least 1980. I then express deep skepticism about the continued
effectiveness of this model and its policy implications. First, I show
how modern empirical research on deterrence argues that we have
gone much too far in our use of incarceration; in brief, we incarcerate
far too many criminals and for too long with no discernible social
benefit and substantial social costs. Second, I cite evidence from
behavioral law and economics to demonstrate that the rationality that
the standard deterrence model assumes is highly unlikely to
characterize the behavior of those who are committing crimes. Finally,
I consider some recent developments in human genome studies to
suggest that human behavior generally, and criminal behavior
specifically, are likely to be far more complex than the standard
deterrence model contemplates.
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INTRODUCTION
This brief Essay is, in a way, a mea culpa, mea maxima culpa for my
many years of toiling away with the blunt tool of a simplistic law-andeconomics model with respect to criminal justice issues. Wielding that
tool, I, like most economically-minded law professors, perceived the
principal social goal of the criminal justice system to be that of
deterring crime—up to the point at which the social cost of further
deterrence was exactly equal to the social benefit of the last unit of
crime deterred. While I have no particular qualms about that goal, I
now have a somewhat different view of the abilities of the standard
tools upon which we have relied as being suitable explanations of the
causes and consequences of the varying levels of crime and of the
ability of incarceration, fines, and other sanctions to deter people from
committing crimes.
Why the change of view? I would like to believe that with age has
come some wisdom, but perhaps it is true that being trained as a
professional economist simply delayed that acquisition of wisdom, and
what I am really doing is just catching up to the rest of many of the
attendees at this conference. But that factor is almost certainly not as
important in my change of view as is the remarkable new scholarship on
crime that has emerged in the past twenty or so years. There is progress
in human affairs and even in legal scholarship, and that progress does
not come, as Max Planck memorably said, only after the funerals of
older scholars.1 As I hope will become evident in this Essay, new
empirical evidence—both directly about the deterring effects of criminal
sanctions and about the decision-making and judgmental errors to which
potential criminals (and the rest of us) are prone—has persuaded me
that we need to look afresh at criminal justice system policies of
deterrence.
Here is how I proceed. I begin with a very brief review of the
standard law-and-economics view of criminal law and punishment. I
recount both the Beckerian theoretical account of the rational choice,
theory-based decision to commit a crime and some of the early
empirical evidence that sought to examine whether the theory accurately
described and predicted actual criminal behavior. Then, in Part III, I
turn to a consideration of a newer empirical literature, based principally
in economics, that persuasively holds that we are imprisoning too many
1. See ALEX ZHAVORNOKOV, THE AGELESS GENERATION: HOW ADVANCES IN BIOMEDICINE
WILL TRANSFORM THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11 (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) (attributing the quote,
“Science advances one funeral at a time,” to Max Planck).
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people and that we can lower incarceration rates without substantially
increasing crime rates. Then, in Part IV, I give a brief overview of
some theoretical and empirical insights from behavioral economics and
cognitive and social psychology that raise, I believe, some very big
questions about the foundations of the deterrence possibilities of
criminal law. And finally, I take wing and discuss some remarkable
new developments in genomic biology that may someday, perhaps
someday soon, give us an entirely different way of talking about why
some people commit crime, and what might be done to deter them from
doing so.
I. THE STANDARD LAW-AND-ECONOMICS ACCOUNT OF CRIME,
SENTENCING, AND DETERRENCE
The standard law-and-economics account of the decision to commit a
crime and of how to deter crime is well known. So, let me just
summarize the heart of the account.
Following the famous theory of the late Professor Gary Becker,2
economists and law-and-economics scholars assume that potential
criminals are rational calculators like the rest of us. Criminals know
their preference orderings; that is, they know what goods and services
give them pleasure and which do not. They seek to allocate their time,
wealth, and mental and physical efforts so as to maximize their wellbeing. So, in deciding whether to commit a crime, they compare the
expected benefits of successfully completing the crime with the
expected costs. Those expected costs include the product of the
probabilities of detection, arrest, conviction, and the value of the
sanction that the criminal will face if he or she is found guilty.3 The
expected benefits include the material and psychic well-being that will
come from, say, stealing the large-screen TV and either enjoying it at
home or selling it (at a discount).
Presumably, the rational potential criminal will commit the crime if
the expected benefits exceed the expected costs and will refrain if the
expected costs exceed the expected benefits.
There is one more significant element of the theory: the criminal
justice system can influence the decision to commit a crime by affecting
2. See ROBERT D. COOTER & THOMAS S. ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 454–84 (6th ed. 2012)
(explaining the economic theory of criminal behavior). See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Analysis, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
3. A more complete model might include an estimate of the present discounted value of lost
future legitimate employment opportunities if convicted; the psychic costs of violating one’s
cultural, ethical, or religious proscriptions against committing a crime; and so on.
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the expected costs of crime. And because, by assumption, criminals do
not pay attention to the individual elements of those expected costs but
only to the summary product of the underlying calculations, the criminal
justice system (on behalf of society as a whole) can choose to raise
those costs in four ways: (1) by increasing the probabilities of detection,
arrest, and conviction; (2) by increasing the value of the sanctions, such
as the length of the sentence; (3) by doing a little of both; and (4) by
increasing the returns from legitimate work.4
Generally speaking, the early theorists of this rational choice theory
of crime thought that the most effective ways to reduce crime were to
increase the returns from legitimate work and to increase the sentences
for all crimes. This would be done while still attempting to preserve
relative differences between crimes that signal their relative social
costs—for example, that battering another person is more socially costly
than simply stealing her handbag and should, therefore, be punished
more severely.
There is typically a small additional amendment to this deterrence
theory. Raising the expected costs of crime by increasing the
probabilities of detection, arrest, and conviction typically costs real
money. One must, for instance, put more police officers on the streets
or more cameras in public and private places (and monitor them) in
order to increase the probability of detection. To increase the
probability of conviction, one must have more courtrooms, more judges,
more prosecutors and staff, more public defenders and staff, and
possibly, more jails and prison space.
One can also increase the expected costs of crime and achieve greater
deterrence by simply increasing the level of sanctions. Of course, the
relative differences among those sanctions must be preserved, and
potential criminals must be made aware of those increased sanctions.
But if that is done, and on the assumption that increasing the level of
sanctions raises the expected costs of crime and requires no real
expenditures—other than the political costs of persuading the legislature
4. Interestingly, subsequent empirical work in the 1970s demonstrated that the deterrent effect
of making legitimate work more certain and more rewarding had the greatest deterrent effect of
all of the possibilities just listed. An implication of that finding (and of the theory) is that cyclical
changes in the state of the economy and the labor market might have a counter-cyclical effect on
crime—that is, that as the economy grows stronger (with employment increasing), crime should
decrease, and vice versa. Empirical work has not confirmed this effect, with one notable (and
contrary) exception: auto theft tends to be pro-cyclical. Auto theft increases as the economy
grows and declines as the economy contracts. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 485–531
(introducing crime rates and statistics and using that information to discuss the effects of various
punishments on deterring crime).
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to raise those sanctions—then raising the sanctions for crimes is, all else
equal, one of the most efficient means of deterring crime.5
There is one other policy implication of this theory that is worth
comment. Variance in the sentences for a particular crime is potentially
confusing to rational potential criminals. One could well have made
two arguments in favor of variance in sentencing. First, the particular
circumstances or characteristics of the convicted criminal might vary to
such an extent that justice demands leaving to the sentencing judge the
determination of where in the distribution of possibilities to place any
given convictee. Judges would, with the assistance of experience,
determine where in the range of possibilities of this indeterminatesentencing regime the circumstances most suitably placed the convictee.
Second, one might well have argued that the greater the variance in the
sanction for a given crime, the greater the uncertainty facing any
potential criminal, and that increased uncertainty might have played
havoc with the deterring effect of criminal sanctions.6
While one might plausibly argue that a rational potential criminal will
focus on the mean or mode of the distribution, regardless of its variance,
many of those who thought about these matters feared that the larger the
uncertainty about the sanction, the less deterring any given sanction
would be. Hence, these considerations made a case in favor of
sentencing guidelines that reduced the variance of criminal sanctions by
replacing discretionary ranges of sentences with determinate sentencing,
thereby sending crisper and clearer signals to those contemplating
committing crimes.7
That, at any rate, is the standard economic account of crime. Like all
theories, it is only as good or as bad as its description of the world is
accurate and of how well it explains the data and predicts real events.
5. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 508–09 (explaining how a fine system could be more
efficient than imprisonment).
6. There is a well-developed economic theory of decision making under uncertainty that might
apply. However, that theory’s predictions about how potential criminals would have reacted to
any given level of variance in the sanction for a given crime depended in large part on the
criminal’s taste for risk. The more risk-preferring a potential criminal, the greater the likelihood
that he or she would commit a crime as the uncertainty increased. The more risk-averse a
potential criminal, the lower the likelihood that he or she would commit a crime as the uncertainty
of a given level of sanction increased. Surely there must be differences in the risk attitudes of
potential criminals. Yet, I assume that most students of the subject would have been reluctant to
assume risk-aversion among most real potential criminals and far more likely to assume riskseeking attitudes. But to my knowledge, this is a topic that is under-investigated.
7. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 1,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/about/overview/USSC_Overview.pdf (last visited
Nov. 11, 2014) (discussing the overall goals of the sentencing commission).
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Economists and lawyers in the 1970s and early 1980s undertook many
empirical investigations to test the descriptive and predictive accuracy
of the Beckerian theory of crime. Many of those investigations found
support for the deterrence theory (as the Becker theory was frequently
called). There are far too many of those to canvas here,8 but one should
be aware that the empirical support for the deterrence theory ran from
relatively minor felonies, such as evading the military draft as a protest
against the Vietnam War,9 to more serious felonies, such as
manslaughter and theft or destruction of property.10
While most studies were done using U.S. data, some scholars—
noting that the theory would seem to apply to human beings anywhere
and at any time—studied the relationship between sanctions and crimes
in different countries and in different historical periods. Those studies,
like the contemporary ones, tended also to find a deterrent effect
between the level of sanctions and the quantity of crime.11
By far the most famous of the early empirical studies was the
outgrowth of a doctoral dissertation done by Isaac Ehrlich, now himself
a distinguished scholar, under Gary Becker at the University of
Chicago. Ehrlich’s hypothesis was that if sanctions deter, then the most
severe sanction—capital punishment—is likely to have a deterrent
effect.12 In a very clever econometric study, Ehrlich found that one
execution deterred between seven and eight subsequent murders.13 In
the years after the publication of Ehrlich’s work, other scholars have

8. For a brief summary of the empirical evidence on crime and deterrence of the 1970s and
1980s, see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 485–531. See generally Steven D. Levitt &
Thomas J. Miles, Empirical Study of Criminal Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 458–59 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (introducing the authors
of the various economic models of crime).
9. See Alfred Blumstein & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Criminal Sanctions on Draft
Evasion, 28 STAN. L. REV. 241, 259 (1977) (discussing the morality of the Vietnam War and the
public opinion’s influence on sentencing draft dodgers).
10. See Levitt & Miles, supra note 8, at 470–76 (using the scale of imprisonment and capital
punishment rates to evaluate and test the economic model of crime).
11. See, e.g., Kenneth I. Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England
and Wales, 1894–1967, 86 J. POL. ECON. 815 (1978); Kenneth I. Wolpin, Capital Punishment
and Homicide in England: A Summary of Results, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 422 (1978).
12. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 397 (1975) [hereinafter Ehrlich, Deterrent Effect]
(“[P]unishment and law enforcement deter the commission of specific crimes”).
13. Ehrlich, Deterrent Effect, supra note 12, at 414; see Isaac Ehrlich, Capital Punishment
and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Additional Estimates, 85 J. POL. ECON. 741, 779
(1977) (using cross-sectional data from 1940 and 1950 and finding a stronger deterrent effect of
executions on murder rates—with between twenty and twenty-four murders deterred by one
execution).
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published numerous articles that were critical of Ehrlich’s finding that
there was a clear deterrent effect of capital punishment.14
The Becker theory and the theoretical and empirical work to which it
gave rise changed not only the academic study of crime, but also greatly
changed criminal justice system policies. Consider two examples. In
the mid-1980s, the federal government became persuaded that reducing
the variance of criminal sentencing was a good thing. So, Congress
provided for the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission
(“Commission”), an independent agency of the U.S. Judiciary, as a part
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.15 The Commission
undertook a comprehensive review of federal sentencing for individual
and corporate crimes and issued (and has since revised) the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).
A notable feature of the Guidelines, much remarked on by those at
the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Conference,16 was its
reduction in the discretion allowed to federal judges in their sentencing.
The central reason for that move toward more determinate sentencing
was not any particular dissatisfaction with the federal judiciary in its
role of imposing criminal sanctions. Rather, the articulated reason for
the Guidelines was to reduce the variance in those sanctions as a means
of conveying a clearer message about the consequences of being
convicted of various crimes, and thereby to make the calculation of the
expected costs of committing a particular crime easier and, therefore,
more deterring.17
As a second example, consider the recent history of incarceration and
crime. In 1980, there were approximately 500,000 prisoners in all state
and federal prisons and local jails, and the U.S. incarceration rate (the
number of prisoners per 100,000 population) was roughly equal to that
of other countries in the developed world. By the early 2000s, the total
number of prisoners in the United States was well over two million.
That four-fold increase put the United States in the forefront of all
14. See, e.g., Levitt & Miles, supra note 8, at 474–76 (refuting the claim that capital
punishment acts as an effective deterrent to crime); Peter Passell & John Taylor, The Deterrent
Effect of Capital Punishment, Another View, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 445, 450 (1977) (concluding
that one cannot properly reach the conclusion that capital punishment deters criminal activity
based on Ehrlich’s evidence).
15. See An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 7, at 1 (“The
United States Sentencing Commission was created by the Sentencing Reform Act provisions of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.”).
16. The Loyola University Chicago Law Journal held its Symposium, entitled “Sentence
Structure: Elements of Punishment” on April 4, 2014.
17. An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission, supra note 7, at 1–3.
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nations in terms of the rate of its incarcerated population. To put the
matter dramatically, the United States has approximately 5% of the
world’s population but has about 25% of the world’s prisoners.18
Because at about the same time that this remarkable increase in
incarceration occurred the rate of crime fell dramatically, there was a
natural inclination to attribute this decline to the increased use of
incarceration. That is, the increase in the level and certainty of
sanctions and the subsequent decline in the quantity of crime seemed to
indicate the causal connection that the Becker theory had hypothesized.
As we shall soon see, this causal connection may be too facile. The
causes of the dramatic decline in crime since the early 1990s are
complex and various.
II. RECENT LAW-AND-ECONOMICS LITERATURE ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
It would be remarkable if there had been no change in the law-andeconomics literature on crime and punishment since the outpouring of
scholarly literature on that topic in the 1970s. And, indeed, there has
been much change. In this Part, I review the academic literature—
principally empirical—that has appeared in the last twenty or so years
and that has given me cause to reassess the academic beliefs of the
inaugural period of law-and-economic scholarship on crime and
punishment.
There is one overwhelming reason that academic views of the
criminal justice system might have changed. There have been nearly
forty years of additional experience and evidence from which to learn
about criminals’ decisions to commit crimes and the deterrent effect of
criminal sanctions.
Demographics have changed, making the
population older and, therefore, less prone to commit crime. There have
been periods of moratorium in the application of the death penalty—
nationally from 1972 to 1976, and in Illinois when Governor Ryan
suspended the death penalty in 2000.19 The economy has altered in
significant ways, not just in the patterns of boom and bust, but also in
the continuing shift away from manufacturing and toward services. The
technology of policing and of protection for properties and persons has
altered.20 The level of sanctions for such crimes as drug offenses has
18. I shall return to the deterrent effect of longer and more-certain prison sentences in the next
Part.
19. Martha Irvine, Illinois Suspends Death Penalty, SANDUSKY REG., Feb. 1, 2000, at D-2.
20. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 489 (explaining that private costs to prevent crime
increased from $65 billion in 1993 to $100 billion in 2008).
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increased and become more certain.21 The application of the death
penalty and the number of executions have significantly decreased since
2000.22 The number of police per capita deployed in, principally, our
urban areas, and the changing techniques for policing, such as the
increasing use of statistical reports to identify “hot spots,” have also
changed.23 The discretion in sentencing violators to prison, noted
above, has diminished.24 And much else that might have an effect on
the level and deterrence of crime has also changed. These changes are
so many and so pervasive that it would be astonishing if careful analysis
did not reveal some significant alterations in what we know about why,
where, and when people commit crimes and whether they can be
deterred.
One of the most notable changes of the recent past has been the
decline in both violent and non-violent crime that began in the early
1990s and has continued through at least the first decade of the twentyfirst century. “Crime rates fell nearly 30 percent between 1991 and
2001, and subsequently fell an additional 22 percent between 2001 and
2012.”25
Scholars have sought to understand what factors might account for
this prolonged and significant drop in crime.26 As I noted above, an
easy explanatory variable to point to is the increase in the number of
violators who were incarcerated. This is based on the theory that those
who are in prison cannot commit crime (leading to a drop in the amount
of crime, unless they are quickly replaced by others), and that those not
in prison, who are contemplating a crime, are deterred by learning of the
sanctions imposed on those who were convicted of a crime. Because

21. MELISSA S. KEARNEY ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT: BROOKINGS INST., TEN
ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2014).
22. See Death Penalty Facts, AMNESTY INT’L 3, http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/DeathPen
altyFactsMay2012.pdf (last updated May 2012) (noting that death sentences in the U.S. have
declined since 2000 and that executions have fallen from ninety-eight in 1999 to thirty-seven in
2008, forty-six in 2010, and forty-three in 2011); see also Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why
Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 163, 175 (2004).
23. Id. at 172.
24. See, e.g., id. at 178 (providing statistical analysis to claim that increased punishment and
its transparency are active deterrents to future crime).
25. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 4.
26. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 120 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2007) (stating that the decline in crime in the 1990s and early 2000s had multiple
causes that are difficult to disentangle and that until we know why a similar decline occurred in
Canada—which has a different criminal justice system from but similar demographics to the
United States—we cannot be certain which factors explain the decline in crime).
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my central point in this Essay is that I have grown skeptical of the
simplistic “sanctions deter crime” hypothesis, let me mention a few
pieces of recent scholarship that question that hypothesis generally and
its particular role in explaining the drop in crime from 1991 to the
present.
In a 2004 article, Steven D. Levitt, one of the most careful students of
crime, suggested that, of ten plausible policies that might have
accounted for the decline in crime in the 1990s and early 2000s, four of
them have some explanatory power while six do not.27 The four factors
to which Levitt points as explaining the decline are the following: (1)
increases in the number of police; (2) the rising prison population; (3)
the receding crack epidemic; and (4) the legalization of abortion in
1973.28 Note that Levitt includes an increase in the number of people
incarcerated as one of those factors. In fact, he estimates that increases
in expected punishment “can account for a reduction in crime of
approximately 12 percent for [homicide and violent crime] and 8
percent for property crime, or about one-third of the observed decline in
crime.”29 This is a significant fraction of the explanation. But it is not
as great as the explanatory fraction that he and his co-author, John
Donohue, attribute to the final factor. In their famous article on that
topic, Donohue and Levitt attributed 50% of the decline in crime to the
legalization of abortion in January 1973,30 in Roe v. Wade.31
27. Levitt, supra note 22, at 163–64.
28. Id.; see COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 526–31 (explaining these four factors as well as
the six factors that do not help explain the decline: (1) the strong economy; (2) changing
demographics; (3) better policing strategies; (4) gun control laws; (5) laws allowing the carrying
of concealed weapons; and (6) increased use of capital punishment).
29. Levitt, supra note 22, at 177–78.
30. John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, 116
Q.J. ECON. 379, 382 (2001). Of that 50%, Donohue and Levitt attribute half to what they call the
“cohort size” effect and half to the “cohort quality” effect. The cohort size effect holds that the
decline in the births of young men and women because of the significant increase in the number
of legal abortions throughout the 1970s led to there being many fewer eighteen-year-old young
men, beginning in 1991 and continuing thereafter. Because young men are disproportionately
responsible for crime, the fact that there were fewer of them as a result of Roe v. Wade accounts,
the authors say, for 25% of the decline in crime that began in 1991. The cohort quality effect
arises, Donohue and Levitt claim, because the availability of legalized abortion allows women
and their partners to make situation-sensitive decisions about when to have their children. If, for
example, a woman becomes pregnant at a time when she has no health insurance, or no job, or no
one to help her in child-rearing, she might choose to have an abortion and postpone child-bearing
until her circumstances improve. There have been some questions raised about the statistical
techniques by which Donohue and Levitt reached their conclusion. See generally William
Anderson & Martin T. Wells, A Bayesian Hierarchical Regression Approach to Clustered and
Longitudinal Data in Empirical Legal Studies, 7 J. EMP. L. STUD. 634 (2010); Christopher L.
Foote & Christopher F. Goetz, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime: A Comment, 123 Q.J.
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Another factor that does not apparently deter serious crime—and
contributes to skepticism about the earlier law-and-economic models—
is the death penalty. There has been a plenitude of recent scholarship
on this matter.32 Recently, John Donohue and Justin Wolfers published
two remarkable articles attempting to evaluate the more recent empirical
studies of the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Their more recent
article concludes:
The important arithmetic of the death penalty is that it can only have a
possible useful effect on a very small number of individuals—those
that would not be deterred by the prospect of life without possibility of
parole but would be deterred by the presence of the death penalty. In
other words, if we look at New York—a state with no capital
punishment (as of 2004), a large population (19,300,000) and a
relatively low murder rate (4.77 per 100,000 people)—we find that
921 murders occurred in 2006. Assuming that 921 roughly represents
the number of murderers in New York in 2006, then this represents the
maximum number of individuals whose behavior could have been
changed in a socially acceptable manner by the presence of a death
penalty law (at least under a rational actor model). But against these
921 murderers who might potentially have been deterred by capital
punishment, there were about 19,299,000 individuals in New York
who were not deterred by the threat of capital punishment (since it was
nonexistent and yet they still did not kill). This number is roughly
20,000 times as great as the number of murderers in New York in
2006. If the death penalty has a brutalization effect, then we at least
have to think about whether any of the 19,299,000 current
nonmurderers might be subject to a malign influence of capital
punishment that would work in opposition to any possible benign
influence that could potentially influence only 921 individuals.33
ECON. 407 (2008).
31. 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973).
32. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Emprical Evidence in
the Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2005); Lawrence Katz et al., Prison
Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L. ECON. REV. 318 (2003). In a recent
op-ed piece, Justin Wolfers notes that the likelihood of actually being executed once a prisoner is
on death row is remarkably low. There were, for example, only forty-five executions in 2013
from a nationwide death-row population of approximately 3000 prisoners.
If a death sentence puts you at the back of the queue of 3,000 prisoners to be executed,
and only 50 people are executed each year, then it would take you, on average, 60
years to reach the front of the line. Not surprisingly, many die of natural causes while
waiting their turn.
Justin Wolfers, Life in Prison, With the Remote Possibility of Death, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/upshot/life-in-prison-with-the-remote-possibility-ofdeath.html.
33. John J. Donohue III & Justin Wolfers, Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on
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The other empirical evidence to which I want to draw attention has to
do with the relationship between incarceration and crime. To review,
the United States has the highest rate of incarceration of any country in
the world. “The incarceration rate in the United States . . . increased
during the past three decades, from 220 in 1980 to 756 in 2008, before
retreating slightly to 710 in 2012.”34 This rate is more than five times
the global average of 130 per 100,000 and more than six times the
average rate in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) countries.35 Because there are several things
that can cause an increase in incarceration, such as an increase in crime
rates, a greater proportion of convictions that result in incarceration than
was the case before, and an increase in the average sentence imposed, it
is important to note that the principal factor accounting for the four- to
five-fold increase in the incarceration rate in the United States since
1980 is policy change. Namely, an increased likelihood that “an
arrested offender will be sent to prison, as well as the time prisoners can
expect to serve, has increased for all types of crime.”36
We have already seen that Levitt attributed one-third of the decline in
nonviolent crime in the 1990s to the increase in incarceration. But one
wonders whether the further declines that have occurred since Levitt’s
article—another decline of approximately 22%—can be causally linked
to increases in incarceration. As we just saw, incarceration increased
until about 2007 and has decreased since then. But even after 2007, the
decline in crime has continued.37 Could it be the case that at some point
between the late 1990s and 2007 we passed the point at which further
incarceration could deter crime? If so, that suggests that the
Murder, 8 AM. L. ECON. REV. 249, 296 (2009).
34. KEARNEY ET AL., supra note 21, at 9. The next three highest countries are Chile (266),
Estonia (238), and Israel (223). An important question, of course, is why the U.S. rates are so
much higher. Citing various other sources, Kearney et al. point to three factors: (1) the homicide
rate in the U.S. is approximately four times that of other developed countries; (2) U.S. drug
policies are much stricter than those in other countries; and (3) sentences, especially for drug
offenses, are much longer than in other developed countries. Id. at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 9 (citing STEPHEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, WHY ARE SO MANY
AMERICANS IN PRISON? (Russell Sage Found. 2013); Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Why
Are So Many Americans in Prison?, in DO PRISONS MAKE US SAFER? THE BENEFITS AND COSTS
OF THE PRISON BOOM 27–72 (Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll eds., 2009)).
37. See Uniform Crime Reports: Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate per 100,000
Inhabitants, 1993–2012, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crimein-the-u.s.-2012/tables/1tabledatadecoverviewpdf/table_1_crime_in_the_united_states_by_volum
e_and_rate_per_100000_inhabitants_1993-2012.xls (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (showing that the
volume and rate of crime per 100,000 residents in the United States have changed significantly
over the past twenty years).
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relationship between deterrence and crime is more complex than we had
imagined.
In a very recent article, Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll
explored the deterrent effect of the high rate of incarceration in the
United States.38 The heart of their study is that there are diminishing
returns to the crime-deterring effects of incarceration and that the
United States has pushed well past the point at which those diminishing
returns have set in.39 As a result, they argue, states and the federal
government could release significant numbers of prisoners without
causing a significant increase in crime.40
Raphael and Stoll explore the impact of changes in incarceration on
crime by comparing recent experiences in Italy and California.41
First, consider Italy’s experience with sudden prisoner releases to
relieve prison overcrowding. In 2006, the Italian Parliament, the
Catholic Church, and Pope John Paul II grew concerned about the fact
that Italian prisons were operating at 130% capacity, causing significant
overcrowding. Parliament passed, on July 31, the Collective Clemency
Bill, which “reduced the sentences of most Italian prison inmates
convicted prior to May of that year by three years, effective the
following day.”42 As a result, there was a significant decrease in the
prison population during August and September 2006, relieving the
overcrowding. During the period before and after the clemency, the
Italian rate of incarceration—approximately 103 in 100,000 (which was
roughly the U.S. rate before 1980) before the pardon43—was much
lower than that in the United States, which was roughly 750 in 100,000.
The effect of the clemency on the Italian crime rate was large. There
was a sharp increase in the years just after the clemency. “The
magnitude of the increase in crime coinciding with the mass prisoner
release suggests that on average each released inmate generates fourteen
reported felony crimes per year.”44
This finding is in line with the hypothesis of diminishing marginal

38. STEVEN RAPHAEL & MICHAEL A. STOLL, THE HAMILTON PROJECT: BROOKINGS INST., A
NEW APPROACH TO REDUCING INCARCERATION WHILE MAINTAINING LOW RATES OF CRIME,
(2014) [hereinafter RAPHAEL & STOLL, REDUCING INCARCERATION].
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id. at 9.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id. at 10 (quoting Paolo Buonanno & Steven Raphael, Incarceration and Incapacitation:
Evidence from the 2006 Italian Collective Pardon, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2437, 2450 (2013)).
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returns to incarceration as a crime-deterring strategy. As Raphael and
Stoll put it, “[w]hen prisons are used sparingly, incarceration is reserved
for the highest-risk and most-serious offenders.”45 And prisons were
used sparingly in Italy (despite the overcrowding), as the above figure
for the incarceration rate showed. That implies that when the mass
release occurred, some very serious and high-risk offenders were back
in society. There should be no surprise, therefore, that crime rates
increased significantly after the implementation of the Collective
Clemency Act.
California’s experience with a similar situation is instructive. In the
early 2000s, the problem of prison overcrowding was so severe in
California that the 156,000 prisoners in the system were twice what the
system had been built to handle.46 In 2009 a federal appellate panel
held that the overcrowding was a violation of the prisoners’
constitutional rights and ordered the State of California to relieve the
situation within two years.47
California enacted legislation in April 2011 to comply with the court
decisions and began implementing reforms in October 2011. Among
other correctives, the “legislation halted the practice of revoking
parolees back to prison for technical violations and diverted many
nonserious, nonviolent, nonsexual offenders to jail sentences and
sentences to be served via some form of community corrections.”48
The reduction in the prison population in California occurred much
more slowly than it had in Italy, but the reduction was just as
significant. By May 2013, California had reduced its prison population
by 28,000, or 17% since October 2011.49 This resulted in a significant
45. Id. at 9.
46. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (class action lawsuit on behalf of California
prisoners).
47. See id. at 1923 (upholding the appellate court decision by a vote of five to four); see also
Ariane De Vogue, Supreme Court: California Must Slash Prison Population by At Least 30,000,
ABC NEWS (May 23, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/supreme-court-california-reduceprison-population-30000/story?id=13666195&singlePage=true (reporting on the Supreme Court’s
decision to alleviate overcrowding in California prisons). The ABC News story also includes a
comment by Steve Levitt from the Freakonomics blog on that decision’s consequences if that
many prisoners were to be released. Steven D. Levitt, The Supreme Court Provides a
Dissertation Topic for a Budding Economist, FREAKONOMICS (June 1, 2011, 11:27 AM),
http://freakonomics.com/2011/06/01/the-supreme-court-provides-a-dissertation-topic-for-a-buddi
ng-economist/ (“California’s violent crime rates should rise about 4 percent relative to the rest of
the U.S. over the next few years. That adds up to about 80 extra homicides a year.”) (citing
Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison
Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319, 336–39 (1996)).
48. RAPHAEL & STOLL, REDUCING INCARCERATION, supra note 38, at 10.
49. Id.
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lowering of the incarceration rate. At the time of the passage of the
reform legislation, the incarceration rate in California was 426 per
100,000.50 By the end of 2012 the incarceration rate (including the
approximately 8000 who had been transferred from prison to county
jails) was 354 per 100,000, roughly the rate that prevailed in the early
1990s.51
What was the effect of the prisoner releases on the crime rate in
California? Raphael and Stoll found almost no evidence of an increase
in violent crime but a modest increase in non-violent property crimes.52
The California crime consequences of prisoner release are less
dramatic than might have been predicted and less significant than those
that followed the implementation of pardons in Italy. Why the
difference? One important difference is that California implemented a
more selective and more gradual release program than did Italy (which
did exclude from pardon some serious offenders). But almost certainly
the most significant difference has to do with the pre-reform
incarceration rates and the diminishing marginal crime-reduction gains
from imprisonment. Recall that California’s pre-release rate was more
than four times greater than Italy’s pre-release rate, suggesting that
California had used incarceration for a broader range of crimes,
particularly less serious felonies, than had Italy. This fact, when
combined with the more selective California release practices, meant
that those most likely to be released from the overcrowded California
prisons were less serious offenders and, therefore, less likely to commit
crime—particularly violent crime—upon their release. As Raphael and
Stoll put it: “[w]hen the incarceration rate is high, the marginal crimereduction gains from further increases tend to be lower, because the
offender on the margin between incarceration and an alternative
sanction tends to be less serious.”53
There are important criminal justice system policy implications of
these findings. Raphael and Stoll press two strategies: “introduc[ing] a
greater degree of discretion into U.S. sentencing and parole practices,
and incentiviz[ing] local authorities to reserve prison for those who pose
the greatest risk.”54 The result, they believe, will be a dramatic
lowering of the incarceration rate in the United States without much of
50. Id.
51. Id. at 10–12.
52. The increase was from roughly 80,000 incidents per month before the reform to
approximately 90,000 incidents per month after the reform. Id. at 11–12.
53. Id. at 9.
54. RAPHAEL & STOLL, REDUCING INCARCERATION, supra note 38, at 14.
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an increase in the crime rate (and what increase there might be will be in
non-violent crime).
III. BEHAVIORAL INSIGHTS AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING
The new empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of the death
penalty and the relationship between incarceration rates and crime rates
presents strong evidence for being skeptical about deterrence. But there
is more evidence—this time from some recent work in behavioral law
and economics.
Behavioral law and economics is, I believe, one of the two most
important developments occurring in legal scholarship.55 It begins with
the proposition that real human beings do not often behave as the
rational choice theory predicts that they will. Literally hundreds—
possibly thousands—of empirical studies support this proposition by
showing behavior that is inconsistent with the standard microeconomic
assumption that people are rational decision-makers.
There are some well-known standard examples. One that is relevant
to decision making regarding crime is overoptimism bias or
overconfidence bias. This is the belief that good things are more likely
than average to happen to us while bad things are less likely than
average to happen to us.56 For example, in a famous article, Neil
Weinstein reported on an experiment he performed on a sample of
students at Rutgers University.57 First, he gave each student a list of
positive events that might take place in his life and asked each student
to estimate the likelihood that each event would happen to him and also
to compare that estimate to an estimate of the likelihood that that event
would happen to his classmates.58 Of the eighteen positive events, such
as owning their own home or marrying someone wealthy, the mean
respondent estimated his chances to be greater than the average for his

55. For a modern introduction, see generally Thomas S. Ulen, The Importance of Behavioral
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 93 (Eyal Zamir &
Foron Teichman eds., 2014) (discussing behavioral law and economics).
56. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091 (2000) (defining
“overconfidence bias”).
57. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY
SOC. PSCYHOL. 806, 809 (1980).
58. Id.; see Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems,
5 J. BEHAV. MED. 442, 446 (1982) (explaining a different study that measures overconfidence
bias). But see Adam J. L. Harris & Ulrike Hahn, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events:
A Cautionary Note, 118 PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 136 (2011) (reevaluating the method used to
conduct optimism research).
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peers in fifteen of the events.59 Second, Weinstein asked each student
to estimate the likelihood of a range of negative events, such as having a
drinking problem or developing cancer, happening to him and to
compare that likelihood with an estimate of each negative event’s
happening to his classmates. The mean response was that these adverse
events were less likely to happen to him than to his classmates in
twenty-two of twenty-four events.60
In another famous study, Lynn Baker and Robert Emery found that
although most respondents knew that close to half of all marriages end
in divorce, when asked to predict the likelihood that their marriage
would end in divorce, the modal response was zero.61 That may not be
surprising, but it is not necessarily what rational choice theory would
predict.
The obvious connection to the decision to commit a crime is that
criminals, like the rest of us, are overoptimistic about their own
likelihood of success and greatly underestimate their own likelihood of
failure. As a result, they may, in the language of the Becker model,
overestimate the expected benefits of crime or underestimate the
probabilities of detection, arrest, and conviction.
And these
miscalculations may lead them to commit more crimes than would be
the case if they had a more accurate estimate of the costs and benefits of
their actions.
Paul Robinson of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
John Darley of the Department of Psychology at Princeton University
have argued that criminal law does not deter.62 More precisely, they
believe that the criminal justice system probably does deter crime, but
they are very doubtful that specific criminal laws deter crime.63 That is,
they want to draw a distinction between such actions as the legislative
manipulation of sentence length, which they believe does not have a
deterrent effect, and such actions as increasing police patrols or the
59. Weinstein, supra note 57, at 810–11.
60. Id.
61. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average:
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW HUM. BEHAV. 439,
443 (1993). But who would want to marry someone who had a clear-eyed view of the probability
of divorce?
62. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science
Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2004); see Paul H. Robinson & John M.
Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When
Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950–51 (2004) (explaining why the “penalty-setting system”
designed by lawmakers is not effective).
63. Robinson & Darley, supra note 62, at 174–75.
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harshness of prison conditions, which they believe might deter crime.64
The authors base their contention on findings in the behavioral
sciences.65 They write that for criminal law to have a deterrent effect
on a potential criminal’s conduct choices,
[T]he following three questions must all be answered in the
affirmative:
A. Does the potential offender know, directly or indirectly, and
understand the implications for him, of the law that is meant to
influence him? . . .
B. If he does know, will he bring such understanding to bear on his
conduct choices at the moment of making his choices?
C. If he does know the rule and is able to be influenced in his choices,
is his perception of his choices such that he is likely to choose
compliance with the law rather than commission of the criminal
offense? That is, do the perceived costs of non-compliance
outweigh the perceived benefits of the criminal action so as to bring
about a choice to forgo the criminal action?66

Robinson and Darley argue that there is evidence that none of these
premises is true.67 They report on surveys that they and others have
conducted in different states about a limited number of legal rules to
ascertain how well a random sample of citizens knows prevailing
criminal laws.68 One survey of a “target population” (not the general
population) of potential offenders found that 18% of them had no idea
what the sanctions for several crimes would be, 35% said that they did
not pay attention to what the sanction would be, and only 22% thought
they knew exactly what the punishment would be.69 So, the authors
conclude, “people rarely know the criminal law rules.”70
One might propose that the better dissemination of information about
what constitutes criminal activity and about sentencing and other
sanctions would be a means of getting people to make better decisions
about criminal and legitimate uses of their time. But one of the most
64. Some of the following accounts of Robinson and Darley draw on COOTER & ULEN, supra
note 2, at 495–96.
65. Robinson & Darley, supra note 62, at 174.
66. Id. at 175.
67. Id. at 175–96.
68. Id. at 175–77.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 176. They recognize that this may be an overgeneralization. Many people know
about important inflection points in the criminal sanctions. For example, the penalties for a given
crime jump considerably when a juvenile becomes an adult. So, it should not be surprising to
learn that when juveniles pass the age to become an adult, they commit fewer crimes. Id. at 176–
77.
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important articles (and now, a book) in recent legal scholarship—by
Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago Law School and Carl
Schneider of the University of Michigan School of Law—persuasively
argues that information disclosure has almost no discernible effect on
behavior.71 It has not worked at all in affecting fuel economy decisions
by automobile buyers;72 it has no discernible impact on people’s health
decisions about what to eat, what not to eat, how much to exercise, and
the like;73 it has had no good effect and possibly a deleterious effect on
decisions regarding retirement savings;74 and it has had almost no effect
on improving financial literacy.75 Given all these failures, it would
seem to be a safe prediction that dissemination of information about
crimes and sentences would not alter an individual’s behavior.
Robinson and Darley also point out that the overall rate of conviction
for crimes is extremely low—approximately 1.3% of all crimes result in
a conviction—and the chances of a convicted criminal receiving a
prison sentence is about one hundred to one for most offenses.76 Many
in the general population may not know these facts. Rather, they may
believe that the chances of being detected, arrested, and convicted are
much higher and are, therefore, deterred from committing crime. But
career criminals, their friends, and their relatives are likely to know how
low the conviction and punishment rates really are. In short, we know
very little about how people inform themselves about the risk of
detection, arrest, and conviction of a crime. What little we do know
71. See generally OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); Omri BenShahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647
(2011).
72. See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1665−73 (2014) (discussing the effect of behavorial economics and
automobile purchasing decisions).
73. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS 111 (Harper Collins 2008) (discussing the problem of procratination and the possible
root causes); DOUGLAS E. HOUGH, IRRATIONALITY IN HEALTH CARE: WHAT BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS REVEALS ABOUT WHAT WE DO AND WHY 21–24 (Stanford Econ. & Fin. ed., 2013)
(same).
74. See, e.g., Bubb & Pildes, supra note 72, at 1630–32 (analyzing the difficulties that tax
subsidies and information concerning them causes individuals contemplating and planning
retirement).
75. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, The Financial Education Fallacy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 429,
430 (2011) (discussing the influece of product information on the financial descisions and
knowledge of consumers); Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1155, 1224 (2013) (claiming that, even if information on consumer products is released,
consumers fail to use it to their advantage).
76. Robinson & Darley, supra note 62, at 184. “Even the most serious offences [sic], other
than homicide, have conviction rates of single digits.” Id.
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suggests that they do not engage in the processes imagined by rational
choice theory and that they are, therefore, likely to be ill-informed about
the true risks associated with committing a crime.
One of the most intriguing points that Robinson and Darley make is
that the duration of prison sentences may not have a deterrent effect.
They note that people adapt fairly quickly to changed circumstances; for
instance, there is evidence that within six months of incarceration,
prisoners have returned to their pre-incarceration level of subjective
well-being.77 And there is compelling evidence that in remembering
experiences, we all suffer from “duration neglect”—that is, we do not
accurately remember the duration of good or bad experiences.78
As a result of these psychological findings, it is possible that thoughts
of imprisonment may deter those of us who have not been “inside,” but
that for those who have been imprisoned, they recall the experience as
not as bad as they had anticipated. To the extent that that remembrance
informs their own future behavior, incarceration—both because of
hedonic adaptation and duration neglect—may not deter them from
future criminal activity. And if they communicate their incarceration
experience to others in their community who have not been imprisoned
that the experience is “not so bad,” then they may undermine the
deterrent effect on others that we have heretofore expected criminal
sanctions to have.
There is, of course, significantly more research that must be done on
these matters, but even at this first blush, these findings from behavioral
law and economics strongly suggest that while there may be some or
even many people who behave as the rational choice theory proposes,
77. Id. at 188–90 (citing Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in
WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1999)). “Hedonic adaptation” refers to the well-established fact that human beings tend to return
to their previous level of subjective well-being whenever some event or circumstance pushes
them above or below that “set point” of subjective well-being. Researchers are not certain where
our “set point” of happiness comes from—for example, from our genes or environment—but they
are fairly certain that it is extremely difficult for subsequent events and circumstances to move us
away from the set point permanently. For the classic study of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Philip
Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERS. SOC.
PSYCH. 917, 923 (1978) (discussing the effects certain events have on one’s overall happiness
rating).
78. A distinctive aspect of “duration neglect” is that in remembering events, we tend to focus
on what happened at the peak or trough of the experience and what happened at the end, not at all
focusing on how long the experience lasted. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND
SLOW 380–81 (2011) (explaining the studies that have attempted to measure duration neglect);
Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients’ Memories of Painful Medical Treatments:
Real-Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures, 116 PAIN 3, 7
(1996) (same).
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those who are most likely to commit crime—because they have
committed crime—behave in ways not predicted by rational choice
theory. As a result, policies meant to deter rational actors may not
adequately deter those most in need of deterrence.
IV. THE DYNAMIC GENOME AND CRIME
To this point, I may have been perceived as walking among you here
on the ground. But now I want to take wing to write to you from a great
height about some truly remarkable scholarship from a completely
different source. I think that there is a good probability that once it
develops, this literature may shed some very bright light on human
behavior generally and in particular on why some people commit
crimes, and how we might influence people not to commit crimes.
I recently organized a panel presentation at the University of Illinois
College of Law by four scholars from the University’s Institute for
Genomic Biology.79 The audience—primarily the faculty at the College
of Law—was extremely receptive but had to be spoken to nontechnically, which the presenters did very articulately. The nub of what
they had to say was this: until about ten years ago, most people believed
that “DNA is destiny.” As in, we inherit genes from our parents, that
those genes influence a great deal of our traits and behavior (somewhere
between 40–60%; more with regard to some traits like height), and that
the only device at our disposal to change behavior is the environment or
context in which people find themselves. At best that environment can
only affect about 50% of our behavior. But that effect only lasts, at
best, during the life of an individual (unless the effect manages to
change the environment permanently or to get embedded in culture).
That account, it turns out, is only half true. One of the most
remarkable findings of genomic biology over the last ten or so years is
that during an individual’s life, the environment or context can have an
effect on an individual’s genes, and those changes can be passed on to
his offspring.80
Most of the examples of this “dynamic genome” that the panelists

79. The panel appeared on April 2, 2014, and consisted of Gene Robinson, Director of IGB;
Allison Bell, Professor of Animal Biology; Brent Roberts, Professor of Psychology; and Ripan
Malhi, Professor of Anthropology.
80. See Gene E. Robinson, Beyond Nature and Nurture, 304 SCIENCE 397, 399 (2004)
(discussing the study of genes and behavior); Gene E. Robinson, The Behavior of Genes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/13/opinion/13robinson.html?module=
Search&mabReward=relbias%3Aw%2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A11%22%7D&_r=0
(discussing the ability of gene influence by the environment).
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gave us had to do with animals other than humans. But because all
genomes are conserved (that is, do the same thing in all organisms), the
panelists strongly believe that these examples also explain some human
behavior. They referred to some new findings that suggest that some
events—such as famine and mistreatment of children—can cause
changes in the genes of those who are famished and mistreated that not
only affect their behavior throughout their lives, but may also be passed
on to their children. That is, simply removing mistreated children from
abuse and neglect may not be enough for them to overcome the
mistreatment. The results may stay with them throughout their lives
and their children’s lives and beyond.81
I think that the implications of these findings for the study of human
behavior might be profound.82 Many of our current policies in a wide
range of matters are premised on the view that changing the external
incentives facing decision-makers, or altering the environment or
institutional details within which decision-makers act are the key to
achieving both socially and individually optimal results. While I do not
mean to denigrate these views entirely, it does seem to me to be the case
that the discovery of the dynamic genome complicates this
tremendously. For example, simply removing individuals from a bad
situation or presenting them with a strong external incentive to behave
in a different fashion may not be enough if a powerful event has altered
their genes and if the altered gene is an important determinant of their
behavior. Moreover, to the extent that the altered gene is heritable, the
behavior may continue for an additional generation or more.
To connect these thoughts to the central topic of this Essay, I do not
suggest that criminal behavior is genetically determined. I do not have
the learning to speak on that matter. However, we do know that some
behavior is genetically influenced and, crucially, that behavior can
influence genes so that there may be influences running from crime and
81. See, e.g., Nathan Nunn & Leonard Wantchekon, The Slave Trades and the Origins of
Mistrust in Africa, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 3221, 3249 (2011) (stating that the slave trades in Africa
have led to significant amounts of distrust, even generations since their occurrence). Arguing that
traumas suffered in parts of Africa during the last wave of the slave trade—when, in the late
nineteenth century, neighbors and family turned over their acquaintances and family members to
the slave traders—gave rise to a culture of mistrust that was transmitted through generations
down to the present. That is, long-forgotten events, never directly experienced, can have
important repercussions in societies decades later through the transmission of cultural norms and
beliefs. Id.
82. For a survey of cases in which courts have sought to evaluate how genes may have
influenced culpable behavior, see generally Deborah W. Denno, Courts’ Increasing
Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal
Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967 (2011).
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punishment to genes and from genes to crime and punishment. In a
very real sense, all this suggests how narrow our understanding of
human behavior is. There are processes going on within each of us of
which we are only dimly aware and may be relatively powerless to alter.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that the simplistic rational choice model of crime and
punishment of the 1970s may have outlived its ability to inform our
criminal justice policies. The empirical work of the past thirty-five
years has presented evidence that some of the deterrence we thought
that we were likely to get was not, in fact, forthcoming. Although there
are other reasons than deterrence to argue for the death penalty, the
evidence is that the threat of capital punishment is not likely to deter
many death-eligible homicides. And we appear to have long since
passed the point at which incarcerating more criminal offenders
achieves significant deterrence. Finally, behavioral studies have
presented us with further empirical evidence that those whom we most
seek to deter from criminal acts are not likely to be deterred by any of
the policies currently in force. In brief, it is time to re-think our
accounts of criminal behavior so that we can design policies better
suited to deterrence.
I conclude with a cautionary note. We know much less than we need
to know about human behavior. Our current tools for influencing that
behavior may be no better than were the flint tools that our ancestors
used 100,000 years ago to fashion implements when compared to
today’s highly technical machine tools. At a very minimum, we should
be very skeptical of simplistic theories like rational choice theory that
have so deeply influenced our criminal sentencing policies over the last
forty years. I have a deep fear that 200 years from now humans will
look back on what we have been doing over the last forty years in
criminal justice with the same mixture of horror and wistfulness with
which we look back on criminal policies of the late Middle Ages.

